Part IV: Smoldering Embers: Aftermath
"There is no immediate alternative to Zarqawi," the senior Iraqi intelligence official said. "There will be a vacuum of leadership. His close circle, his organization, will not agree on one of them to succeed him. There is the prospect of division in this group."
--"Hatred He Bred Is Sure to Survive Terrorist's Death," Dexter Filkins, New York Times, June 9, 2006.
"This is the best way to undermine a terrorist group," said Mr. Hoffman of the RAND Corporation. "Information sows internal discord and disloyalty has a radiating effect in the organization. That could set in motion the unraveling of al Qaeda."
--ibid
"No one behind him had the kind of charisma and operational intellect that he brought to the table," said one military official familiar with the hunt for Zarqawi. "Our hope is no one can step in, and you end up with fragmentation and perhaps dissension among his followers."
--"After Zarqawi, No Clear Path in Weary Iraq," Ellen Knickmeyer, Washington Post, June 9, 2006.
What if the breath that
kindled those grim fires
Awakened, should blow them into
Sevenfold rage,
And plunge us into the flames?
--"Paradise Lost," Book II, Milton
There seem to be two schools of thought on the death of Zarqawi. One line of thinking is that his loss, combined with the fact that he was betrayed by one of his own and the intelligence gathered in the raid that shuts down other related cells, will lead to disarray in the ranks and eventual disintegration of the movement.
Maybe. Or maybe it's a bit of wishful thinking. Because there's another, flip-side to those hopes, and that is that not only will his death not make any discernable difference in the long run, but that it may, in fact, make things worse.
"The immediate aftermath of this will probably be an upsurge of violence," as Sunni insurgents hurry to show that Zarqawi's killing has not broken the resistance," said Michael Clarke, an expert on terrorism at the International Policy Institute of King's College London.
"In the medium term, in the next month or two, it will probably help to downgrade sectarianism…But the dynamics of sectarian violence is probably past the point of no return."
--"After Zarqawi, No Clear Path In Weary Iraq," Ellen Knickmeyer, Washington Post, June 9, 2006.
Some have pointed out that, in fact, we may have done Bin Laden a favor.
"The man was a burden on al Qaeda," said Abdel Bari Atwan, editor of the London-based al-Quds al Arabi newspaper and a noted Palestinian observer of international militant groups.
"I believe personally that President Bush unintentionally gave al-Qaeda a huge reward in getting rid of Zarqawi…He was an unmanageable bully who forced himself as a leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq."
Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's founding leaders, are likely to try to put in place a leader "they have more operational control of"…according to a longtime participant in the U.S. military hunt for Zarqawi.
"To them, this day serves two purposes," the participant said. "They've got their martyr, and they can put one of their guys in who they've been grooming, who is not running around playing master and commander of the battlefield but is going with the party line, and that is the danger."
--ibid
Observers also held out the possibility that, since Bin Laden had objected to Zarqawi's targeting of Muslim civilians, that the insurgency might concentrate more on attacking U.S. and coalition forces.
"We're looking for an increase in insurgent activity as each wannabe-Zarqawi vies for status as the baddest boy on the block," an Army officer in Baqubah, near the scene of the lethal airstrike, said in an e-mail.
"We've been here so many times: the killing of Uday and Qusay Hussein, the capture of Saddam, the elections, the transfer of sovereignty, the new government--all marked by euphoria, lots of talk of tipping points, lots of high fives and then dismay as Iraq continues to spiral into oblivion," said retired Marine Lt. Col. Dale Davis, a former intelligence officer still active in the Middle East.
--ibid
And then, of course, there is the unspoken "M" word: martyr.
"If it is just Zarqawi, it is largely a political and propaganda victory and could disappear as quickly as capturing Saddam or killing his sons," said Anthony H. Cordesman, a defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "You are going to turn him into a martyr to those who support his cause…That doesn't necessarily make it worse for the insurgency."
--ibid
Mr. Zarqawi's relationships with home-grown leaders of that insurgency and with top al Qaeda leaders around Osama bin Laden were, in fact, often troubled. The circumstances of his death, however, could well erase all recollection of those differences in order to enshrine him as a useful martyr. In that new role, his memory could continue to haunt Iraq for some time to come.
--"Death of a Terrorist," editorial, New York Times, June 9, 2006.
In the end, however, you can indeed kill the arsonist, but the fire burns on. Zarqawi tapped into a reservoir of tribal hatreds and revenge fantasies of deepest dark side of the Iraqi people, deliberately recruiting the poorest, most downtrodden and angriest young men in the country to act out those Medieval fantasies with the help of modern technology and the Internet, and when he did so, he unleashed the hounds of hell.
As Sabrina Tavernise wrote in the New York Times, "the thick new flow of bodies from assassinations by Sunni and Shi'ite militias would continue without him. Three years of violence has sown hate in many hearts.".
"Zarqawi is part of a story, and this story will not end when he is finished," said Dhia Majid, a university professor whose brother, a pediatrician, and his wife, a pharmacist, were shot dead in western Baghdad last summer.
"It's not Iraq. It's a slaughterhouse."
--"Zarqawi is Dead, but Weary Iraqis Fear the Violence Won't Subside," Sabrina Tavernise, New York Times, June 9, 2006.
"The terrorists are here now, here among us," said Haifa Hassan, whose 12-year old son was tortured and killed several weeks ago after having been kidnapped as he walked home from school. "They are criminals. That is their work."
--ibid
In fact, there are dozens of other insurgent groups, such as the Ansar Al Sunna and the Islamic Army of Iraq, which have little or no relationship to al Qaeda at all. Some, in fact, are deadly rivals, and their work will continue unabated.
But not all the news is bad. For one thing, the more we chop off the hydra-heads of the nest of snakes, the more we are left with a chaotic, squirming body of amateurs not nearly as crafty as Bin Laden and al-Zarqawi.
As William Arkin points out on his Washington Post blog, "The more success that is scored against the battle hardened, the more U.S. (and Iraqi) special forces get to fight raw recruits and newcomers to the battle, amateur fighters who have proven to be not quite as well trained and easier to target."
Many have said that it, in the long run, it is going to be up to the Iraqi people to decide, Enough is Enough. And there have been promising signs.
The Americans wisely chose to hold off the announcement of Zarqawi's death until it could be announced, in a Parliamentary news conference, by the new Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki.
And when he did so, the Iraqi reporters burst into applause and cheers and spontaneous chanting of prayers from the Q'uran.
Riding that wave of good feeling, Maliki seized the moment to announce--at long last--his choices for the crucial posts of interior minister, defense minister, and national security minister--and called an immediate vote from his restive and rebellious parliament.
Caught up in the joy, they overwhelmingly approved--after literally months and months of squabbling and threats, thus opening up the logjam that has held the new government hostage since the elections in January of '05.
The new interior minister, who will be in charge of those "death squad" militias, is a Shi'ite, Jawad al-Bolani, and unlike his predecessor, he has no ties to the militias.
The new defense minister, who will handle the Iraqi Army, is Abdul-Oadier Muhammed Jasim, a Sunni who served as commander of Iraqi forces during the massive military operation in Fallujah, 2004.
And the new national security minister, a Shi'ite, is Sheerwan al-Waeli.
As William Arkin writes in his Washington Post blog, "We can't know today what the success will mean…There is no denying tha an Iraqi national military, government, and people are slowly moving in the direction of some normalcy and security. This is good news, because it is imperative that the United States leave Iraq and leave its security to its own people--and that can only happen when Baghdad has assumed enough responsibility to allow an exit."
In the long run, the wisest take on this whole mess was made by the grieving mother of the 12-year old boy murdered by Zarqawi's thugs:
"It's not about Zarqawi."
In my next entry, I will examine the global picture, the full repercussions all over the world of Zarqawi, his operation, and his death, and the political implications of those things here in the United States.
--"Hatred He Bred Is Sure to Survive Terrorist's Death," Dexter Filkins, New York Times, June 9, 2006.
"This is the best way to undermine a terrorist group," said Mr. Hoffman of the RAND Corporation. "Information sows internal discord and disloyalty has a radiating effect in the organization. That could set in motion the unraveling of al Qaeda."
--ibid
"No one behind him had the kind of charisma and operational intellect that he brought to the table," said one military official familiar with the hunt for Zarqawi. "Our hope is no one can step in, and you end up with fragmentation and perhaps dissension among his followers."
--"After Zarqawi, No Clear Path in Weary Iraq," Ellen Knickmeyer, Washington Post, June 9, 2006.
What if the breath that
kindled those grim fires
Awakened, should blow them into
Sevenfold rage,
And plunge us into the flames?
--"Paradise Lost," Book II, Milton
There seem to be two schools of thought on the death of Zarqawi. One line of thinking is that his loss, combined with the fact that he was betrayed by one of his own and the intelligence gathered in the raid that shuts down other related cells, will lead to disarray in the ranks and eventual disintegration of the movement.
Maybe. Or maybe it's a bit of wishful thinking. Because there's another, flip-side to those hopes, and that is that not only will his death not make any discernable difference in the long run, but that it may, in fact, make things worse.
"The immediate aftermath of this will probably be an upsurge of violence," as Sunni insurgents hurry to show that Zarqawi's killing has not broken the resistance," said Michael Clarke, an expert on terrorism at the International Policy Institute of King's College London.
"In the medium term, in the next month or two, it will probably help to downgrade sectarianism…But the dynamics of sectarian violence is probably past the point of no return."
--"After Zarqawi, No Clear Path In Weary Iraq," Ellen Knickmeyer, Washington Post, June 9, 2006.
Some have pointed out that, in fact, we may have done Bin Laden a favor.
"The man was a burden on al Qaeda," said Abdel Bari Atwan, editor of the London-based al-Quds al Arabi newspaper and a noted Palestinian observer of international militant groups.
"I believe personally that President Bush unintentionally gave al-Qaeda a huge reward in getting rid of Zarqawi…He was an unmanageable bully who forced himself as a leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq."
Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's founding leaders, are likely to try to put in place a leader "they have more operational control of"…according to a longtime participant in the U.S. military hunt for Zarqawi.
"To them, this day serves two purposes," the participant said. "They've got their martyr, and they can put one of their guys in who they've been grooming, who is not running around playing master and commander of the battlefield but is going with the party line, and that is the danger."
--ibid
Observers also held out the possibility that, since Bin Laden had objected to Zarqawi's targeting of Muslim civilians, that the insurgency might concentrate more on attacking U.S. and coalition forces.
"We're looking for an increase in insurgent activity as each wannabe-Zarqawi vies for status as the baddest boy on the block," an Army officer in Baqubah, near the scene of the lethal airstrike, said in an e-mail.
"We've been here so many times: the killing of Uday and Qusay Hussein, the capture of Saddam, the elections, the transfer of sovereignty, the new government--all marked by euphoria, lots of talk of tipping points, lots of high fives and then dismay as Iraq continues to spiral into oblivion," said retired Marine Lt. Col. Dale Davis, a former intelligence officer still active in the Middle East.
--ibid
And then, of course, there is the unspoken "M" word: martyr.
"If it is just Zarqawi, it is largely a political and propaganda victory and could disappear as quickly as capturing Saddam or killing his sons," said Anthony H. Cordesman, a defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "You are going to turn him into a martyr to those who support his cause…That doesn't necessarily make it worse for the insurgency."
--ibid
Mr. Zarqawi's relationships with home-grown leaders of that insurgency and with top al Qaeda leaders around Osama bin Laden were, in fact, often troubled. The circumstances of his death, however, could well erase all recollection of those differences in order to enshrine him as a useful martyr. In that new role, his memory could continue to haunt Iraq for some time to come.
--"Death of a Terrorist," editorial, New York Times, June 9, 2006.
In the end, however, you can indeed kill the arsonist, but the fire burns on. Zarqawi tapped into a reservoir of tribal hatreds and revenge fantasies of deepest dark side of the Iraqi people, deliberately recruiting the poorest, most downtrodden and angriest young men in the country to act out those Medieval fantasies with the help of modern technology and the Internet, and when he did so, he unleashed the hounds of hell.
As Sabrina Tavernise wrote in the New York Times, "the thick new flow of bodies from assassinations by Sunni and Shi'ite militias would continue without him. Three years of violence has sown hate in many hearts.".
"Zarqawi is part of a story, and this story will not end when he is finished," said Dhia Majid, a university professor whose brother, a pediatrician, and his wife, a pharmacist, were shot dead in western Baghdad last summer.
"It's not Iraq. It's a slaughterhouse."
--"Zarqawi is Dead, but Weary Iraqis Fear the Violence Won't Subside," Sabrina Tavernise, New York Times, June 9, 2006.
"The terrorists are here now, here among us," said Haifa Hassan, whose 12-year old son was tortured and killed several weeks ago after having been kidnapped as he walked home from school. "They are criminals. That is their work."
--ibid
In fact, there are dozens of other insurgent groups, such as the Ansar Al Sunna and the Islamic Army of Iraq, which have little or no relationship to al Qaeda at all. Some, in fact, are deadly rivals, and their work will continue unabated.
But not all the news is bad. For one thing, the more we chop off the hydra-heads of the nest of snakes, the more we are left with a chaotic, squirming body of amateurs not nearly as crafty as Bin Laden and al-Zarqawi.
As William Arkin points out on his Washington Post blog, "The more success that is scored against the battle hardened, the more U.S. (and Iraqi) special forces get to fight raw recruits and newcomers to the battle, amateur fighters who have proven to be not quite as well trained and easier to target."
Many have said that it, in the long run, it is going to be up to the Iraqi people to decide, Enough is Enough. And there have been promising signs.
The Americans wisely chose to hold off the announcement of Zarqawi's death until it could be announced, in a Parliamentary news conference, by the new Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki.
And when he did so, the Iraqi reporters burst into applause and cheers and spontaneous chanting of prayers from the Q'uran.
Riding that wave of good feeling, Maliki seized the moment to announce--at long last--his choices for the crucial posts of interior minister, defense minister, and national security minister--and called an immediate vote from his restive and rebellious parliament.
Caught up in the joy, they overwhelmingly approved--after literally months and months of squabbling and threats, thus opening up the logjam that has held the new government hostage since the elections in January of '05.
The new interior minister, who will be in charge of those "death squad" militias, is a Shi'ite, Jawad al-Bolani, and unlike his predecessor, he has no ties to the militias.
The new defense minister, who will handle the Iraqi Army, is Abdul-Oadier Muhammed Jasim, a Sunni who served as commander of Iraqi forces during the massive military operation in Fallujah, 2004.
And the new national security minister, a Shi'ite, is Sheerwan al-Waeli.
As William Arkin writes in his Washington Post blog, "We can't know today what the success will mean…There is no denying tha an Iraqi national military, government, and people are slowly moving in the direction of some normalcy and security. This is good news, because it is imperative that the United States leave Iraq and leave its security to its own people--and that can only happen when Baghdad has assumed enough responsibility to allow an exit."
In the long run, the wisest take on this whole mess was made by the grieving mother of the 12-year old boy murdered by Zarqawi's thugs:
"It's not about Zarqawi."
In my next entry, I will examine the global picture, the full repercussions all over the world of Zarqawi, his operation, and his death, and the political implications of those things here in the United States.
posted by Deanie Mills at 6:59 AM
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